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Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe
Kit Kinports*
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued its controversial decision
in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,1 holding that Congress may not
use its Article I powers to abrogate the immunity from suit ac-
corded to the states by the Eleventh Amendment.2 In so doing,
the Court erected a roadblock in front of congressional efforts
to enforce against the states legislation governing such diverse
areas as the environment,3 intellectual property,4 bankruptcy,5
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. A.B. 1976,
Brown University; J.D. 1980, University of Pennsylvania. I am very grateful
to Jim Pfander, Laurie Reynolds, and Steve Ross for their helpful comments
on earlier drais of this Article.
1. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
2. The Eleventh Amendment provides that "[tihe Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNST. amend. XL
3. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the Coures ruling "prevents Congress from providing a
federal forum for a broad range of actions against States," including those al-
leging violations of environmental laws); Philip Weinberg, Environmental
Law, 1995-96 Survey of New York Law, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 541, 549-50
(1997) (observing that Seminole Tribe will prevent those who are injured by
state-operated hazardous waste sites from suing the states or their officials
under federal environmental laws).
4. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurispru-
dence After Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and
Other Causes of Action over Which the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Juris-
diction, 37 EMORY L.J. 645, 704-06 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What Is
Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1720-22, 1745-46 (1997);
Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific Prog-
ress, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 667, 698 n.226 (1997); Susan D. Raively, Note, Copy-
right Infringement Suits Against States: Is the Eleventh Amendment a Valid
Defense?, 6 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 501, 504 (1988); see also infra notes
109-111 and accompanying text (describing pre-Seminole Tribe opinion hold-
ing that state had impliedly consented to be sued under the Copyright Act).
5. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 & n.1 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign -Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next
Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 (1996); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence
Through a Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases,
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antitrust,6 labor relations,7 telecommunications, civil rights,9
veterans' affairs, 0 and Native American affairs."'
47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1, 32 (1996); Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1720-22.
In the wake of Seminole Tribe, one court has suggested that § 106 of the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1994), constitutes a valid exercise of Con-
gress's power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See In re Burke, 203 B.R. 493, 497
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996). But most courts have concluded that § 106 was
passed pursuant to Article I and is therefore unconstitutional under the
Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe. See In re Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 243-45
(5th Cir. 1997); In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210, 214-16 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); In
re Lush Lawns, Inc., 203 B.R. 418, 421 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996); In re Charter
Oaks Assocs., 203 B.R. 17, 20-21 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996).
6. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1134 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Harris & Kenny, supra note 4, at 706-15; Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1720-22.
7. A number of courts have interpreted Seminole Tribe as invalidating the
amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) that were designed to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Close v. New
York, 125 F.3d 31, 36-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (concluding that the FLSA exceeds
Congress's abrogation power as interpreted in Seminole Tribe); Mills v.
Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 41-49 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Aaron v. Kansas, 115 F.3d
813 (10th Cir. 1997) (same); Raper v. Iowa, 115 F.3d 623, 624 (8th Cir. 1997)
(same); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 207-11 (6th Cir. 1996) (same);
see also Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corrections, 974 F. Supp. 1234, 1241-42
(D. Minn. 1997) (holding that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
is not a valid exercise of Congress's abrogation power); Knussman v. Mary-
land, 935 F. Supp. 659, 663 (D. Md. 1996) (leaving open the validity of abro-
gation in Family and Medical Leave Act). But cf Timmer v. Michigan Dep't of
Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 838-42 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding the Equal Pay Act
as a valid exercise of Congress's abrogation power under section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment).
8. See, e.g., Phillip Rosario & Mark F. Kohler, The Telecommunications
Act of 1996: A State Perspective, 29 CONN. L. REV. 331, 336 & n.22 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Nihiser v. Ohio Envtl. Protection Agency, No. C2-94-1258,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15405 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 6, 1997) (invalidating abrogation
in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Rehabilitation Act);
MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785, 788-89 (N.D. Ala.
1996) (striking down abrogation in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)); J. Clay Smith, Jr., Shifts of Federalism and Its Implications for
Civil Rights, 39 How. L.J. 737, 754 (1996) (expressing concern about Seminole
Tribe's impact on civil rights statutes passed under the Commerce Clause).
But see Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (upholding ADA and
Rehabilitation Act as valid exercises of Congress's abrogation power under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Cor-
rections, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997) (same re ADA); Hurd v. Pittsburgh
State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1542-46 (10th Cir. 1997) (same re ADEA).
10. See, e.g., Palmatier v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, No. 5-95-CV-
168, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13444, at *6-9 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 15, 1997) (striking
down abrogation in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA)). But see Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d
609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996) (concluding that Congress has the power to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment when acting under its war powers, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, and therefore upholding Veterans' Reemployment Rights
794 [Vol. 82:793
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As a result of the Courtes decision in Seminole Tribe, Congress
apparently has the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment protection only when it acts under section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.12 It is the thesis of this Article, how-
ever, that the separate doctrine of implied or constructive
waiver-whereby a state impliedly waives its Eleventh
Amendment immunity-is still alive after Seminole Tribe.
Under that doctrine, which has been lost in the shuffle of the
Court's abrogation decisions, Congress can exercise its Article I
powers to create a legislative regime that conditions a state's
acceptance of federal money or participation in a federally
regulated activity on its waiver of the Eleventh Amendment.
Part I of this Article briefly traces the history of the Supreme
Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, focusing in par-
ticular on the opinions developing the doctrines of implied
waiver and abrogation. Part II makes the case that the doc-
trine of implied waiver retains validity after Seminole Tribe, at
least with respect to federal statutes passed pursuant to the
Spending Clause 13 that condition the receipt of federal funds on
the states' waiver of the Eleventh Amendment and statutes
passed under Congress's other Article I powers that regulate
an activity voluntarily undertaken by the states. Finally, Part
IR considers other potential constitutional impediments to the
resurrection of the implied waiver doctrine, examining both the
scope of Congress's authority under the Spending Clause and,
more generally, the Tenth Amendment's protection of state
sovereignty. 4 The Article concludes that although Seminole
Tribe prevents Congress from unilaterally abrogating the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity when it acts under Article I,
Act, the predecessor to USERRA).
1 See, e.g., Kathryn R.L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How
IGRA Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Iden-
tity, 4 VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 381, 401 n.118 (1997) (noting that Seminole
Tribe deprives tribes of any means of enforcing the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Aces mandate that states negotiate with them in good faith).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (giving Congress "power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of' that amendment). For further dis-
cussion of Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when acting
under section 5, see infra notes 39-50 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 1 (giving Congress the power to "lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States").
14. U.S. CONST. amend. X (providing that "[tihe powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people").
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nothing bars Congress from using its Article I powers to solicit
state waivers of the Eleventh Amendment.
I. THE SUPREME COURTS ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Eleventh
Amendment have been called "tortuous,"15 "confusing and intel-
lectually indefensible,"16 and 'replete with historical anomalies,
internal inconsistencies, and senseless distinctions.' 17 On its
face, the Amendment bars only federal court suits filed against
a state by citizens of another state or of another country, 18 but
since its 1890 decision in Hans v. Louisiana,9 the Court has
insisted that the Amendment also was intended to bar citizens
from suing their own states in federal court.2" Nevertheless,
15. John R. Pagan, Eleventh Amendment Analysis, 39 ARK. L. REV. 447,
449 (1986).
16. John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Im-
munity:A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1891 (1983).
17. JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 11 (1987) (quoting HOWARD P.
FINK & MARKV. TUSHNET, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 137
(1984)).
18. See supra note 2 (quoting the text of the Eleventh Amendment).
19. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
20. The Courts decision in Hans continues to be controversial. During
his tenure on the Court, Justice Brennan was an ardent advocate for the narrow
reading and, ultimately, the overruling of Hans. Originally the lone voice in
this quest, see Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 313-14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting),
Brennan came only one vote shy of convincing his colleagues to overturn Hans
in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 299-302 (1985). Over
the next several years, the majority rebuffed repeated efforts by these four
Justices to overturn Hans. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 293 (1986);
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 78-79 (1985). Speculation about the future of
Hans intensified in 1987, when Justice Scalia refused to take a position on the
correctness of that decision, see Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public
Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 495-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment), but he ultimately sided with the majority. See
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 30-35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Although the four Seminole Tribe dissenters
continue to be critical of Hans, none of them expressly indicated a desire to
overrule the decision. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1142-43
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1153, 1159 (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Court's faithfulness to Hans has also generated a great deal of criti-
cism from academics, most of whom believe that the Eleventh Amendment
was intended to limit only diversity jurisdiction, and not federal question ju-
risdiction. See, e.g., Akbil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425, 1473-92 (1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines (pt. 1), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515
796 [Vol. 82:793
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the Court has concluded that there are two separate circum-
stances in which a plaintiff can bring a suit that would other-
wise be barred by the Eleventh Amendment:21 when the state
(1977); William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1038-
45 (1983); William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CM. L. REV. 1261, 1261 n.3 (1989); Gib-
bons, supra note 16, at 1934-38; Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 3-13
(1988); James E. Pfander, Rethinking the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdic-
tion in State-Party Cases, 82 CAL. L. REV. 555, 648-53 (1994); Suzanna Sherry,
The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1260 (1990); see also James E. Pfander, History and State Su-
ability: An "Explanatory" Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. (forthcoming July, 1998) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to protect the states from federal court suits seeking to collect debts
incurred before the Constitution went into effect, but does not protect the
states from being sued for actions they took in violation of federal rights after
the Constitution took effect). A few scholars disagree with the prevailing aca-
demic view and, though critical of Hans, interpret the Eleventh Amendment
as barring even federal question suits brought by out-of-state citizens. See
Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARV. L. REV. 1342, 1346-49 (1989); Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and
the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. Cmi. L. REV. 61, 135-150 (1989):
But see William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372, 1379-80 (1989) (defending Hans).
21. The Eleventh Amendment bars suits brought against a state by any
plaintiff other than the United States or one of the other states. See Princi-
pality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934) (permitting suits
brought by the federal government or another state on the grounds that they
are "inherent in the constitutional plan"). In addition, the Eleventh Amend-
ment bars suits filed against a state official in her official capacity if the
plaintiff is seeking damages or some other form of retrospective relief. See
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974).
The Amendment does not, however, bar a suit filed against a state official
in her official capacity so long as the plaintiff is seeking only prospective in-
junctive relief. See id. at 664; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
Some commentators have argued that the Ex parte Young exception "sapped
state sovereign immunity of any real bite, leaving only a narrow domain
within which to operate." Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity
"Exception", 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 127 (1996); see also Seminole Tribe, 116
S. Ct. at 1131 n.16 (relying on the availability of injunctive relief under Ex
parte Young in dismissing concerns about the drastic impact of Seminole Tribe
as "misleadingly overbroad7). But an Ex parte Young suit provides no compensa-
tion to the plaintiff, and injunctive relief is not available as a matter of course
in all cases. See generally 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL
LIBERTIEs LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983, at 361-403 (3d ed. 1991)
(describing various limits on injunctive relief). Moreover, the Court's recent
opinion in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997), may evidence
a desire on the part of at least some members of the Court to cut back on the
scope of the Exparte Young doctrine. See id. at 2034 (noting that interpreting
Exparte Young to permit every prospective injunction suit filed against a state
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has waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity, or when Con-
gress has abrogated that immunity. These two doctrines are
examined in the following sections.
A. THE WAIVER CASES
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that the Eleventh
Amendment is subject to waiver.22 Just as states can waive
their sovereign immunity and agree to be sued in their own state
courts, and just as individuals can waive the rights guaranteed
them by the Constitution, so a state can waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal court.23 The Court's
Eleventh Amendment cases have recognized two forms of
waiver: express waiver and implied waiver.
A state expressly waives its Eleventh Amendment protec-
tion by "specify[ing] [its] intention to subject itself to suit in
federal court."24 The doctrine of express waiver involves inter-
official "would be to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the
principle... that Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a real limitation
on a federal court's federal-question jurisdiction"); id. at 2035-40 (opinion of
Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (suggesting that applicability of the Ex
parte Young exception depends upon a case-by-case analysis that examines
the availability of a state forum, the nature of the federal rights at issue, and
the presence of "special factors counselling hesitation"); see also infra note 57(describing restrictions on Ex parte Young doctrine articulated in Seminole
Tribe).
Likewise, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar even a damages suit filed
against a state official in her individual or personal capacity. But an individual-
capacity damages suit does not afford a complete remedy in cases where the
responsible officials are difficult to identify, outside of the court's jurisdiction,judgment-proof, immune, or likely to arouse sympathy from the jury. See,
e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity,
1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 48 (concluding that a "regime of personal official liabil-
ity... seems neither very practical, politically feasible, nor likely to contribute
to harmonious federalism"); Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Propos-
als to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Mis-
conduct, 87 YALE L. J. 447, 456 (1978); Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1794-1804.
22. See, e.g., Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275,
276 (1959) (noting that the Eleventh Amendment "is an immunity which a
State may waive at its pleasure"); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)("The immunity from suit belonging to a State... is a personal privilege
which it may waive at pleasure.").
23. See ORTH, supra note 17, at 123 (noting that the doctrine of waiver
became possible "[o]nce the Supreme Court had linked the Eleventh Amend-
ment with sovereign immunity in Hans v. Louisiana").
24. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 241. Thus, a state does not expressly waive
its Eleventh Amendment immunity by waiving sovereign immunity and con-
senting to be sued in its own state courts, see Florida Dep't of Health & Re-
habilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981)
(per curiam), or even by authorizing suit in "any court of competent jurisdic-
[Vol. 82:793
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pretation of a state statute or constitutional provision as a
matter of state law.25
By contrast, implied waiver-the type of waiver of concern
here-involves an interpretation of a federal statute as a mat-
ter of federal law. The doctrine of implied waiver is most often
associated with the Supreme Court's 1964 ruling in Parden v.
Terminal Railway.26 In that case, the Court held that the State
of Alabama had impliedly consented to be sued by injured em-
ployees under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)2 7
when it chose to operate an interstate railroad:
Our conclusion is simply that Alabama, when it began operation of an
interstate railroad approximately 20 years after enactment of the
FELA, necessarily consented to such suit as was authorized by that
Act. By adopting and ratifying the Commerce Clause, the States em-
powered Congress to create such a right of action against interstate
railroads; by enacting the FELA in the exercise of this power, Con-
gress conditioned the right to operate a railroad in interstate com-
merce upon amenability to suit in federal court as provided by the
Act; by thereafter operating a railroad in interstate commerce, Ala-
bama must be taken to have accepted that condition and thus to have
consented to suit s
Nine years later, in Employees of the Department of Public
Health & Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Welfare
(Missouri Employees),29 the Court distinguished Parden and held
that employees of state health facilities in Missouri could not
sue the state for failing to pay them overtime wages due under
the Fair Labor Standards Act.31 In concluding that the state
had not impliedly consented to be sued, the Court saw no rea-
son to extend the ruling in Parden-which involved "a rather
isolated state activity," a "railroad business.., operated 'for
profit'... in [an] area where private persons and corporations
normally ran the enterprise"-to the facts of Missouri Employ-
tion," Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573, 578-80
(1946).
25. See Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 467
(1945). See generally John Evans Taylor, Note, Express Waiver of Eleventh
Amendment Immunity, 17 GA. L. REV. 513, 526-37 (1983) (describing various
examples and methods of express waiver).
26. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
27. The FELA provides that "[elvery common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the several States ... shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier
in such commerce." 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1994).
28. Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
•29. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
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ees, which involved state hospitals and facilities that were not
"proprietary" and were not "operated for profit," and whose
employees were indistinguishable from "elevator operators,
janitors, charwomen, security guards, secretaries, and the like
in every office building in a State's governmental hierarchy."31
The Court's opinion in Missouri Employees also contained the
seeds of what would later become the "clear statement" rule:
the Court thought it would be "surprising" for Congress to have
"deprived Missouri of her constitutional immunity with-
out.., indicating in some way by clear language that the con-
stitutional immunity was swept away."32
The following year, in Edelman v. Jordan,33 the Court
again refused to find an implied waiver, rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument that the State of Illinois had consented to be sued by
accepting funds under a federal welfare statute. Noting that
"[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated
with the surrender of constitutional rights," the Court con-
cluded that the "mere fact that a State participates in a pro-
gram through which the Federal Government provides assis-
tance for the operation by the State of a system of public aid is
not sufficient to establish consent on the part of the State to be
sued in the federal courts."34 Similarly, the Court observed in
its 1985 decision, Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, that
"the mere receipt of federal funds cannot establish that a State
has consented to suit in federal court."35
Finally, in its 1987 ruling in Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways & Public Transportation,36 the Court expressly adopted
the "clear statement" rule for implied waivers. A state im-
pliedly waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court
said, only when a federal statute expresses in "unmistakably
clear language" Congress's intent to permit suits against the
31. Missouri Employees, 411 U.S. at 284-85.
32. Id. at 285.
33. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
34 Id. at 673.
35. 473 U.S. 234, 246-47 (1985); see also Florida Dep't of Health & Re-
habilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 150 (1981)
(per curiam).
36. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). In Welch, a state employee who was injured
while working on a ferry dock brought suit under the Jones Act, which allows
[amny seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employ-
ment" to bring a damages action against his employer in federal court. 46
U.S.C. App. § 688(a) (1994).
[Vol. 82:793
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state in federal court. In so holding, the Court indicated that
Parden was overruled to the extent it was inconsistent with
this clear statement rule.
38
B. THE ABROGATION CASES
The Supreme Court first recognized Congress's power to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment protection without
their consent in its 1976 decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.39 In
that case, a sex discrimination suit brought by state employees
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,40 the Court
unanimously held that "the Eleventh Amendment, and the
principle of state sovereignty which it embodies, are necessarily
limited by the enforcement provisions of § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment" and that Congress therefore has the power to ab-
rogate the Eleventh Amendment when acting pursuant to sec-
tion 5.41 The Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment,
enacted as part of the wholesale restructuring following the
Civil War, contemplated a "shift in the federal-state balance"
and thus "sanctioned intrusions by Congress... into the judi-
cial, executive, and legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States"-including the authorization of suits
that would be "constitutionally impermissible in other con-
texts."
42
Three years later, however, the Court began to exhibit
some reluctance in inferring that Congress did in fact exercise
the abrogation power recognized in Fitzpatrick. In its 1979
37. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
38. See id.
39. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
41. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456. For the language of section 5, see supra
note 12.
42. Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455, 456. The Court explained:
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising legisla-
tive authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitutional
grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a constitu-
tional Amendment whose other sections by their own terms embody
limitations on state authority. We think that Congress may, in deter-
mining what is "appropriate legislation" for the purpose of enforcing
the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private
suits against States or state officials ....
I& at 456 (citations omitted). For a discussion of additional limits the Court
has recently placed on Congress's power to determine what is "appropriate
legislation" to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, see infra note 62 and ac-
companying text.
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ruling in Quern v. Jordan,4 3 the Court held that Congress did
not intend to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when it en-
acted § 1983, the Reconstruction-era civil rights statute that
created a cause of action in federal court against "[e]very per-
son" who violates a right "secured by the Constitution and
laws" while acting under color of state law." Although the Court
thought there was "no question" that Congress believed § 1983
"ceded to the Federal Government many important powers that
previously had been considered to be within the exclusive
province of the individual States," it refused to "leap ... to the
conclusion that Congress intended by the general language of
the Act to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity
of the several States."4 After examining the language and
legislative history of § 1983, the Court concluded that the statute
does not explicitly and by clear language indicate on its face an intent
to sweep away the immunity of the States; nor does it have a history
which focuses directly on the question of state liability and which
shows that Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States.46
In its 1985 decision in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
lon,47 the Court completed its march toward the clear state-
ment rule, refusing even to consider evidence from the legisla-
tive history of the Rehabilitation Act suggesting that Congress
intended that statute to constitute an exercise of its section 5
abrogation power.45 Instead, the Court said, "Congress may
abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from
suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably
clear in the language of the statute."49 Four years later, the
43. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (creating a cause of action against "[e]very
person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws").
45. Quern, 440 U.S. at 342.
46. Id. at 345. For commentary critical of Quern's reading of the legislative
history of § 1983, see, for example, Bruce McBirney, Note, Quern v. Jordan: A
Misdirected Bar to Section 1983 Suits Against States, 67 CAL. L. REV. 407
(1979).
47. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
48. Although the state argued before the Court that the statute was
passed pursuant to the Spending Clause, and not section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court noted that the defendants had conceded in the courts
below that the statute was an exercise of Congress's section 5 power and
therefore analyzed the statute on that basis. See id. at 244 n.4.
49. Id. at 242 (emphasis added). The majority explained that because
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Court added in Dellmuth v. Muth, "Lest Atascadero be thought
to contain any ambiguity,... [ilegislative history generally will
be irrelevant to a judicial inquiry into whether Congress in-
tended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment." 0
In the late 1980s, the Court turned its attention to the
question of whether Congress's power to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment is confined to statutes passed pursuant to section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. After expressly declining to
resolve this issue on two separate occasions, five members of
the Court agreed in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 2 that Con-
"'the States occupy a special and specific position in our constitutional sys-
tem," id. (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
547 (1985)), it is "incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of Con-
gress's intent before finding that federal law overrides the guarantees of the
Eleventh Amendment," especially in cases where the courts are expanding
their jurisdiction and thereby enhancing their own power. Id. at 243.
The four dissdnters criticized the majority for creating "special rules of
statutory draftsmanship that Congress must obey before the Court will accord
recognition to its act," noting that "[tlhese special rules of statutory drafting
are not justified (nor are they justifiable) as efforts to determine the genuine
intent of Congress" and that "no reason has been advanced why ordinary can-
ons of statutory construction would be inadequate to ascertain [that] intent."
Id- at 253-54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The year following the Court's decision in Atascadero, Congress passed
the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, expressly indicating its intent to
subject the states to suit under the Rehabilitation Act as well as "any other
Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(1) (1994).
50. 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (refusing to find that the Education of the
Handicapped Act met the clear statement rule). For commentary critical of
the clear statement rule, see, for example, William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitu-
tional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593, 621-23, 629-45 (1992) (criticizing
clear statement rules in general, and also noting that the Court "played a kind
of 'bait and switch' trick on Congress" by applying Atascadero's clear state-
ment rule even to older federal statutes); Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred
Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L.
REV. 51, 77-91 (1990). But cf. George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the
Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth:
Some Broader Implications of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO.
L.J. 363, 388 (1985) (defending the clear statement rule because it "ensures
that Congress knew what it was doing" in the abrogation context, and, in the
case of implied waiver, "provides the additional assurance that the state
knows what it is getting into").
5L See Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468,
475 (1987); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 252
(1985).
52. 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114 (1996). For a description of the facts of Union Gas, see infra notes
99-101 and accompanying text.
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gress could abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when legislat-
ing under the Commerce Clause. 3 Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion broadly argued that "[t]he language of the Eleventh
Amendment gives us no hint that it limits congressional
authority; it refers only to 'the judicial power' and forbids
'constru[ingl' that power to extend to the enumerated suits-
language plainly intended to rein in the Judiciary, not Con-
gress."54 In addition, Brennan relied on the theory initially ex-
pounded in Parden that 'the States surrendered a portion of
their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce.' 5 5 Although Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion was joined by only three other Justices, Justice White
provided the critical fifth vote, agreeing with Justice Brennan's
conclusion that Article I gave Congress the authority to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment but indicating, without elabo-
ration, that he did "not agree with much of [Justice Brennan's]
reasoning."5 6
Most recently, in Seminole Tribe, the Court overturned the
seven-year-old ruling in Union Gas, holding this time that Con-
gress does not have the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
53. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
54. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18; see also John E. Nowak, The Scope of Con-
gressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and
the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1469 (1975) (arguing that the Eleventh Amendment was intended to
limit only the power of the federal courts, and thus that "Congress should be
free to determine the extent of federal court jurisdiction over state govern-
ments"); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation,
Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About
Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REv. 682 (1976) (same). But see Martha A. Field, The
Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional
Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1252-61 (1978)
(criticizing the notion that the Eleventh Amendment creates a "dichotomy be-
tween congressional and judicial power").
55. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14 (quoting Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184, 191 (1964)). Justice Brennan explained:
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the States at
the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because the congres-
sional power thus conferred would be incomplete without the author-
ity to render States liable in damages, it must be that, to the extent
that the States gave Congress the authority to regulate commerce,
they also relinquished their immunity where Congress found it nec-
essary, in exercising this authority, to render them liable.
Id. at 19-20.
56. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). For a comprehensive discussion of Union Gas, see Jackson, supra
note 50, at 56-80.
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Amendment immunity when acting under Article I.7 Noting
that "we always have treated stare decisis as a 'principle of
policy,' and not as an 'inexorable command,'" the Seminole
Tribe majority dismissed Union Gas as a "deeply fractured de-
cision" and "a solitary departure from established law."58 Spe-
cifically, the Court held that 'the principle of sovereign im-
munity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial
power established in Art. I" that is "not so ephemeral as to
dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area... that is un-
der the exclusive control of the Federal Government."5 9 The
57. 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1124-32 (1996). Specifically, the Court struck down a
provision in the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7) (1994),
that authorized Native American tribes to bring suit in federal court against
states that failed to comply with their statutory duty to negotiate in good faith
with tribes seeking to enter into compacts that would govern the operation of
certain gaming activities, such as slot machines, lotteries, and casino games.
See id. § 2710(d)(3)(A). The Court acknowledged that the statutory language
indicated a clear congressional intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment,
thereby satisfying the clear statement rule. See 116 S. Ct. at 1123-24. Never-
theless, the Court concluded that the provision had been passed pursuant to
Congress's authority under the Indian Commerce Clause to "regulate Com-
merce ... with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and that Con-
gress lacked the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment when legislating
under its Article I powers. See 116 S. Ct. at 1131-32. But cf. JOHN E. NOWAK
& RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTIONAL LAW 133 (5th ed. 1995) ("Even
during periods when the [Supreme Court was] debating whether to signifi-
cantly restrict the congressional power to regulate intrastate activities under
the commerce power, there was no serious advocacy" of restricting congres-
sional authority under the Indian Commerce Clause because the Court "never
recognized any important or legitimate state interest in... dealings with
American Indians.").
The Court also dismissed the portion of the tribe's suit naming the Gov-
ernor as a defendant. Although the Exparte Young exception to the Eleventh
Amendment does not bar a suit against a state official seeking prospective
injunctive relief, see supra note 21, the Court explained that "where Congress
has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State
of a statutorily created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside
those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon
Ex parte Young." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. Given the statute's re-
peated references to "the State," the Court concluded that Congress did not
intend to create a cause of action against individual state officials. See id. at
1132-33. This portion of the Seminole Tribe decision has received mixed re-
views. Compare David P. Currie, Ex Parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 547 (1997) (defending the Coures position), and Monaghan,
supra note 21, at 126-32 (same), with Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The
Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72
N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 510-41 (1997) (criticizing the Court), and Vdzquez, supra
note 4, at 1715-17 (same).
58. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127, 1128 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 1129, 1131 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halder-
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Court did not, however, question Fitzpatrick's holding that
Congress may abrogate the states' immunity when acting under
the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, the Court distinguished
the Fourteenth Amendment on three grounds: it was adopted
"well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment," its pro-
hibitions are "expressly directed at the States," and it
"fundamentally altered the balance of state and federal power
struck by the Constitution."60
After Seminole Tribe, therefore, Congress's authority to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment is apparently restricted to
statutes passed pursuant to its power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment 61-a power that itself has been limited by
the Court's recent ruling that statutes enacted under section 5
cannot be "substantive," but must instead "remedy or prevent
unconstitutional actions."62 Although the Seminole Tribe decision
has generated a good deal of critical commentary, 63 its impact
man, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)).
60. Id. at 1128, 1125.
61. In Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir.
1996), however, the court held that Congress has the power to abrogate the
Eleventh Amendment when acting under its war powers, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §
8, concluding, without explanation, that Seminole Tribe "does not control the
War Powers analysis." Id.
62. City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2164 (1997). In Boerne,
the Court struck down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994), which prohibited any governmental agency or offi-
cial from "substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion" unless it
could demonstrate that the burden was "in furtherance of a compelling gov-
ernmental interest" and "the least restrictive means of furthering that com-
pelling governmental interest"-that is, unless the burden could withstand
strict scrutiny. Id. § 2000bb-l(b). The Court concluded that RFRA exceeded
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment because it was aimed
at "alter[ing] the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause" as interpreted by the
Court in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882-89 (1990) (refusing
to apply strict scrutiny to neutral, generally applicable laws that have the ef-
fect of burdening particular religious practices), and because, given its "[siweeping
coverage," the statute was "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or
preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164, 2170.
63. See, e.g., Herbert Hovencamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2237-47 (1996) (concluding that Seminole Tribe "offends
both the plain meaning and the historical intent of the Constitution"); Jack-
son, supra note 57, at 500 (describing Seminole Tribe as "a clear mistake from
which the Court should retreat as quickly as possible"); Meltzer, supra note
21, at 65, 21 (referring to the Court's decision as "regrettable" and "not well
supported"); Monaghan, supra note 21, at 103 (claiming that Seminole Tribe
makes a "symbolic statement" about state autonomy, but otherwise has little
effect on the states' accountability for violating federal law); see also supra
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on the implied waiver doctrine has been largely overlooked.
The next part of this Article turns to that issue.
II. THE STATUS OF THE IMPLIED WAIVER DOCTRINE
The doctrines of implied waiver and abrogation, though
related, involve two distinct concepts. Implied waiver presup-
poses a voluntary decision on the part of the states to forego
their Eleventh Amendment protection, whereas abrogation is
an exercise of congressional power to remove the states' im-
munity regardless of their wishes.6' Nevertheless, the two doc-
trines have been hopelessly confused and conflated for some
time. The Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe provides
the opportunity-and the impetus-to resurrect the distinction
between them.
A. THE CONFLATION OF IMPLIED WAIVER AND ABROGATION
PRIOR TO SEMINOLE TRIBE
The implied waiver cases preceded the abrogation cases:
Parden65 was decided in 1964, and it was not until twelve years
notes 54 and 57 (citing additional sources critical of the approach taken in
Seminole Tribe). For additional analysis of the meaning and impact of Semi-
nole Tribe, see Vdzquez, supra note 4.
Some of these commentators have suggested ways of limiting the impact
of Seminole Tribe other than by reviving the implied waiver doctrine. First,
Congress might make clear that a particular federal statute creates a prop-
erty right whose deprivation denies due process, thus triggering Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. See Jack-
son, supra note 57, at 507-10; Meltzer, supra note 21, at 49 n.230; Vdzquez,
supra note 4, at 1744-66. Second, an individual might bring suit against a
state in the name of the United States, which is not subject to the Eleventh
Amendment bar. See Jackson, supra note 57, at 505-06; Meltzer, supra note
21, at 55-57; Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to
Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEx. L. REV. 539 (1995). But see
Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 785 (1991) (expressing
"doubt... that [the federal government's] sovereign exemption can be dele-
gated") (emphasis deleted). And third, an individual could file suit in state court,
where the Eleventh Amendment does not apply, with the eventual possibility
of appellate review in the Supreme Court. See Jackson, supra note 57, at 503-
05; Meltzer, supra note 21, at 57-60; Monaghan, supra note 21, at 125-26; see
also Jackson, supra note 20, at 13-39 (noting the tension in the Court's Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence created by this option). But cf Vdzquez, supra note
4, at 1717-22 (suggesting that Seminole Tribe may preclude Congress from
authorizing suits against the states even in state court).
64. See Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1991) (noting
the distinction between the two doctrines).
65. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). For a description of Parden,
see supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
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later, in 1976, that the Supreme Court first recognized the ab-
rogation doctrine. But even that first abrogation case, Fitz-
patrick v. Bitzer,66 did not clearly distinguish abrogation from
implied waiver. At one point, the majority in Fitz-
patrick remarked that "the necessary predicate for [the implied
waiver] doctrine [is] congressional intent to abrogate the im-
munity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment."67 Likewise, in
Quern v. Jordan,68 the Court supported its conclusion that
Congress had not intended to exercise its abrogation power
when enacting § 1983 by citing Missouri Employees,69 an implied
waiver case, for the proposition that "[o]ur cases consistently
have required a clearer showing of congressional purpose to
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity."70
Later, in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,71 after an-
nouncing that Congress must make its intent clear on the face of
the statute when exercising its abrogation power, the Court went
on to address briefly the plaintiffs implied waiver argument. In
finding insufficient evidence of implied waiver, the Court simply
cited its previous discussion of the abrogation issue, rejecting
the implied waiver argument on the grounds that Congress
had failed to satisfy the clear statement requirement and
therefore had not indicated an intent to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment:
We have decided today that the Rehabilitation Act does not evince an
unmistakable congressional purpose, pursuant to § 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, to subject unconsenting States to the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. The Act likewise falls short of manifesting a
66. 427 U.S. 445 (1976). For a description of Fitzpatrick, see supra notes
39-42 and accompanying text.
67. 427 U.S. at 451-52 (emphasis added). In addition, the Court observed
that the 'threshold fact of congressional authorization'"-"the prerequisite
found present in Parden and wanting in [Missouri] Employees" (both implied
waiver cases)-was clearly present in Fitzpatrick. Id- at 452 (quoting Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672 (1974)).
68. 440 U.S. 332 (1979). For a description of Quern, see supra notes 43-46
and accompanying text.
69. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). For a description of Missouri Employ-
ees, see supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
70. Quern, 440 U.S. at 343 (emphasis added). The Court's opinion in Quern
then went on to distinguish the statute at issue in Missouri Employees, where
the Court had found insufficient evidence of implied waiver, from that at issue
in Fitzpatrick, which found sufficient evidence of abrogation. See id, at 343-44.
71. 473 U.S. 234 (1985). For a description of Atascadero, see supra notes
47-49 and accompanying text.
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clear intent to condition participation in the programs funded under
the Act on a State's consent to waive its constitutional immunity.2
Two years later, the Court explicitly applied Atascadero's
clear statement rule to the doctrine of implied waiver in Welch
v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation.3
In so doing, the Court relied indiscriminately on the implied
waiver line of cases and the abrogation cases, most notably
Atascadero.4  Moreover, in describing its earlier holding in
Parden, the pivotal implied waiver case, the Welch Court used
both "waiver" and "abrogation" language, explaining at one
point that the Parden Court "concluded that the State of Ala-
bama had waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity" and
noting in the very next sentence that the Parden Court
"reasoned that Congress evidenced an intention to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity."71
After Welch, the standards for finding abrogation and
implied waiver were identical, and any distinction between the
two doctrines became moot.76 Although Congress had the
authority to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment under either
the Fourteenth Amendment (per Fitzpatrick) or the Commerce
Clause (per Union Gas), a federal statute that did not comply
with the clear statement rule would not be interpreted as an
exercise of the abrogation power or as an invitation to the
states to impliedly waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The doctrine of implied waiver was basically a dead letter, en-
tirely encompassed within the doctrine of abrogation, and there
was no need for a court to conduct an inquiry into the question
of implied waiver once it had resolved the abrogation issue.
B. RESURRECTING THE DISTINCTION
With the issuance of the Seminole Tribe decision, however,
the distinction between the two doctrines once again becomes
important. Although Seminole Tribe makes clear that a statute
passed pursuant to Congress's Article I powers cannot abro-
gate the states' Eleventh Amendment protection, it does not
necessarily follow that such a statute-assuming it satisfies
72. 473 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added).
73. 483 U.S. 468 (1987). For a description of Welch, see supra notes 36-38
and accompanying text.
74. See Welch, 483 U.S. at 476-78.
75. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
76. But cf. Brown, supra note 50, at 388 (noting that the clear statement
rule performs a different function in the two contexts).
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the clear statement rule-cannot serve as the basis for a finding
that the state impliedly waived its Eleventh Amendment im-
munity. As one commentator has observed, "[ilt actually may
be irrelevant whether Congress does or does not have the
power to suspend state sovereign immunity unilaterally," given
that "one of the few things that is really clear about the Elev-
enth Amendment is that it is subject to waiver by the state"
and that "Congress seems to be free to offer incentives for
waiver." 7
77. Daniel A. Farber, Parody Lost/Pragmatism Regained: The Ironic His-
tory of the Coase Theorem, 83 VA. L. REV. 397, 402-03 (1997) (acknowledging,
however, that "we can't necessarily assume that the Eleventh Amendment is
totally irrelevant in practice, at least not without a careful look at possible
transaction costs"); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the
Eleventh Amendment, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 141, 141-42 (1996) (concluding
that the Eleventh Amendment is subject to waiver, but that requiring consent
from states may increase transaction costs); Meltzer, supra note 21, at 55
(recognizing the possibility that Congress could use its spending power to so-
licit waivers of the Eleventh Amendment, but concluding that implied waiver
is not "a cure-all for the practical concerns voiced by the Seminole dissenters"
because some federal statutes cannot readily be "associated with federal
spending programs"); Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1707-08 & n.112 (discussing
conditional spending statutes as a means of obtaining state waivers of immu-
nity); Constitutional Law Scholars Attempt to Distill Recent Supreme Court
Term, 65 U.S.L.W. 2274, 2288 (Oct. 29, 1996) (quoting Judge Frank Easter-
brook as commenting that, even after Seminole Tribe, "the federal govern-
ment 'has the whip hand in all this'"); cf Jackson, supra note 57, at 504 n.39
(noting that implied waiver is "a possibility left open by Seminole Tribe," but
concluding that it does not permit "the mandatory enforcement of regulatory
legislation").
A number of federal courts have examined the status of the implied
waiver doctrine in the wake of Seminole Tribe. Some of them continue to find
instances of implied waiver. See Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 770-71 (9th
Cir. 1997) (concluding that the state waived the Eleventh Amendment by
agreeing to participate in the Randolph-Sheppard program, a cooperative federal-
state program providing employment opportunities for the blind, given that
the governing federal statute explicitly required participating states to agree
to submit grievances to judicially appealable arbitration); US West Communi-
cations, Inc. v. TCG Seattle, 971 F. Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (W.D. Wa. 1997)
(finding waiver where Congress conditioned state participation in the Tele-
communication Act's interconnection agreement arbitration and approval
process on the state's consent to federal court review of the state's actions,
and the state chose to participate in that process).
Other courts seem to presume that the doctrine retains validity: they
reject the plaintiffs' implied waiver arguments on the merits-typically on the
grounds that the clear statement rule was not met-without discussing what
impact Seminole Tribe has had on the implied waiver doctrine. See Mills v.
Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 50 (1st Cir. 1997) (denying plaintiffs' request for discovery
designed to uncover evidence supporting their waiver argument because they
had not identified any "federal program or statute that supposedly required a
waiver of state immunity as a condition for state participation or receipt of
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Nevertheless, the Second Circuit recently suggested that the
continuing viability of Parden is "precarious,"7 8 and another
court held outright that "Parden has been overruled by impli-
cation by Seminole Tribe."79 Four related arguments have been
made that arguably support this conclusion and militate
against resurrection of the implied waiver doctrine: first, that
Seminole Tribe makes clear that the Eleventh Amendment is
jurisdictional and expressly "precludes Congress from using
Article I to expand Article H";8° second, that litigants cannot
waive jurisdictional requirements;81 third, that Seminole Tribe
federal money"); Booth v. Maryland, 112 F.3d 139, 145 (4th Cir. 1997) (finding
that neither the federal habeas statute nor the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 conditioned state participation on the state's will-
ingness to consent to non-habeas civil suits); Mulverhill v. New York, Nos. 87-
CV-853 & 91-CV-1282, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10109, at *23 (N.D.N.Y. July
10, 1997) (finding that the state had not impliedly consented to be sued under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) because it was involved in hiring and
paying employees before the FLSA was enacted, though recognizing that a
state that "chooses to operate interstate common carrier railroads or ferries"
may impliedly waive the Eleventh Amendment); Hodgson v. Mississippi Dep't
of Corrections, 963 F. Supp. 776, 786-87 (E.D. Wis. 1997) (concluding that no
federal statute provided that states that decide to join interstate compact by
enacting the Uniform Act for Out-of-State Parolee Supervision thereby waive
the Eleventh Amendment); Taylor v. Virginia, 951 F. Supp. 591, 603 (E.D. Va.
1996) (refusing to find implied waiver because the Fair Labor Standards Act
and various federal highway statutes did not "reflect[] Congressional intent to
condition receipt of [federal] funds on waiver of the States' Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity"); Hoeffner v. University of Minn., 948 F. Supp. 1380, 1394 (D.
Minn. 1996) (concluding that the defendant's participation in a federally
regulated experimental drug program did not constitute an implied waiver of
the Eleventh Amendment because the governing federal statutes did not
"evidencefl a congressional intent to subject a State to a waiver of its Eleventh
Amendment immunity if that State should elect to enter the field of drug
manufacture"). See also infra cases cited in notes 117 & 118.
In other cases, however, the courts have questioned the continued viability
of the implied waiver doctrine. See Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 39-41 (2d
Cir. 1997); Digiore v. nlinois, 962 F. Supp. 1064, 1075-76 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
AFSCME v. Virginia, 949 F. Supp. 438, 442 (W.D. Va. 1996); College Sav.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400,
418-20 (D.N.J. 1996); Goebel v. Colorado, No. 93-K-1227, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20929, at *29-31 (D. Colo. June 25, 1996). Nevertheless, all but per-
haps College Savings Bank have seemingly restricted their holdings in some
way. For further discussion of these cases, see infra notes 103 and 118.
78. Close, 125 F.3d at 40.
79. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 420; see also In re Kish, 212 B.R.
808, 815 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997).
80. AFSCME, 949 F. Supp. at 442.
8L See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1158 (1996) (Souter, J.,
dissenting); Meltzer, supra note 21, at 53 n.243 (articulating the argument);
see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (noting that, while a state may waive its sovereign immunity, a
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endorses the position taken by Justice Scalia in his Union Gas
dissent that "the difference between constructive waiver and
abrogation is purely semantic," 2 thus preventing Congress
from "achiev[ing] indirectly, through 'waiver,' what it cannot do
directly, through express abrogation"; 3 and, finally, that Semi-
nole Tribe explicitly rejected the "theory of surrender" underly-
ing Parden, that is, that "'the States surrendered a portion of
their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce.'" 84
With respect to the first argument-that Seminole Tribe
takes the position that the Eleventh Amendment is jurisdic-
tional-it is undeniably true that the Seminole Tribe majority
rejected the idea that Congress can "under Article I expand the
scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article H."85
Specifically, the Supreme Court explained:
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete lawmaking
authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against uncon-
senting states. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power
under Article M, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the con-
stitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. 86
But as the Court emphasizes repeatedly throughout its
opinion, including in the passage quoted above," the Eleventh
Amendment envisions that a state may waive the protection
afforded by the Amendment and seeks to bar only suits against a
state that has not consented to be sued in federal court. For ex-
ample, the Seminole Tribe majority at one point calls the notion
that the states can waive the Eleventh Amendment
"unremarkable."88 At another point, the Court notes that the
"presupposition" underlying the Eleventh Amendment is that
party may not waive defects in subject matter jurisdiction); Brown, supra note
50, at 368 (observing that the doctrine of waiver "conflicts with general prin-
ciples of article II federal court jurisdiction).
82. Digiore, 962 F. Supp. at 1075 (noting in addition that Scalia's dissent
in Union Gas was "cited liberally and with approval" in Seminole Tribe); see
also Goebel, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20929, at *30-31.
83. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 419 (noting in addition that Scalia
"eventually triumphed in Seminole Tribe"); see also Close, 125 F.3d at 40-41;
Digiore, 962 F. Supp. at 1075; AFSCME, 949 F. Supp. at 442.
84. College Say. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 419 (quoting Parden v. Terminal
Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964)). For a summary of Parden's surrender theory,
see supra notes 28 & 55 and accompanying text.
85. 116 S. Ct. at 1128.
86. Id. at 1131-32 (emphasis added).
87. See id. at 1122-23, 1128-29, 1131 n13.
88. Id. at 1128.
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"each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system" and
that '"[iut is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.""89
Thus, there is no jurisdictional or constitutional barrier to su-
ing a state that has consented to be sued. In fact, it would
seem to undermine the notion of "sovereignty" on which the
Eleventh Amendment is premised to disable a state from
choosing to agree to be sued in federal court.
For the same reason, the second argument-that litigants
cannot waive jurisdictional requirements-is inapt in this context.
Although it is true that a federal court's jurisdiction generally
cannot be expanded merely because the parties are willing to
waive a jurisdictional limitation," the jurisdictional bar
erected by the Eleventh Amendment simply does not arise in
cases where the state agrees to be sued. When a state waives
its Eleventh Amendment protection, it is not seeking to waive a
jurisdictional requirement and expand the court's jurisdic-
tion-something it cannot do-but is, by virtue of its waiver,
rendering the jurisdictional requirement inapplicable.91 As the
Supreme Court explained recently in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe,92 the Eleventh Amendment "enacts a sovereign immu-
nity from suit, rather than a nonwaivable limit on the federal
judiciary's subject-matter jurisdiction."93
89. Id. at 1122 (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (quoting
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961))).
90. See generally 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3522, at 66-68 (2d ed. 1984).
91 Cf. Pagan, supra note 15, at 488-89 (arguing that a state that con-
sents to suit "waives not the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, which a liti-
gant never can waive, but rather the privilege of enforcing a limitation on the
exercise of jurisdiction otherwise possessed by the court"). But cf ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 406 (2d ed. 1994) (characterizing this
distinction as "ephemeral" and noting that it "is not followed in other areas of
subject matter jurisdiction").
92. 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997).
93. Id. at 2033 (explaining in addition that the Eleventh Amendment is
not "cast in terms of reach or competence, so [that] the federal courts are alto-
gether disqualified from hearing certain suits brought against a State"); see
also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 57, at 50 (noting that the possibility of
waiver means that the Eleventh Amendment is "not jurisdictional' in the
sense that the requirement of a diversity jurisdiction is jurisdictional");
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 90, § 3522, at 68 (noting that there is an
"exception" to the general rule in cases where the state waives the Eleventh
Amendment).
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The third objection to reviving the implied waiver doctrine
is that Seminole Tribe validated Justice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Union Gas, which advocated abolishing the distinction
between implied waiver and abrogation, thereby preventing
Congress from using "the back door of waiver" to accomplish
any result it cannot achieve under the abrogation doctrine.94
In his Union Gas dissent, Justice Scalia first articulated the
view (ultimately adopted by a majority of the Court in Seminole
Tribe) that Congress may not use its Article I powers to abro-
gate the Eleventh Amendment and then went on to reject the
plaintiffs' implied waiver argument. With respect to implied
waiver, Scalia argued:
There are obvious and fatal difficulties in acknowledging [the doc-
trine of implied waiver] if no Commerce Clause power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity exists.... [A]Ul federal prescriptions
are... in a sense conditional, and-to the extent that the objects of
the prescriptions consciously engage in the activity or hold the status
that produces liability--can be redescribed as invitations to
"waiver."... At bottom .... to acknowledge that the Federal Gov-
ernment can make the waiver of state sovereign immunity a condi-
tion to the State's action in a field that Congress has authority to
regulate is substantially the same as acknowledging that the Federal
Government can eliminate state sovereign immunity in the exercise
of its Article I powers-that is, to adopt the very principle I have just
rejected.95
By way of example, Scalia noted that there was no real difference
between a federal statute making a state liable for the costs of
cleaning up any hazardous waste sites it operated and one that
imposed such liability only if the state "chose" to operate the
sites.96
The first observation to be made about the discussion of
implied waiver in Justice Scalia's Union Gas dissent is that the
Seminole Tribe majority did not even cite or refer to it, much less
endorse it. In fact, the only reference to the implied waiver doc-
trine in the majority opinion in Seminole Tribe suggests that
the Court consciously limited its decision to the abrogation con-
text. The Seminole Tribe majority criticized the Union Gas
plurality for "misreading... precedent" by relying on Parden
to support its holding that the Commerce Clause gave Con-
gress the power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.9 7 The
94. Digiore v. Illinois, 962 F. Supp. 1064, 1075 (N.D. l. 1997).
95. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. See id. at 44.
97. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1128 (1996).
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principle that states may waive the Eleventh Amendment (the
issue in Parden) is "completely unrelated" to the abrogation
doctrine (the issue in Union Gas and Seminole Tribe), the
Court explained in Seminole Tribe.
98
Turning to the merits of Justice Scalia's argument, his
point may well have some validity with respect to the specific
illustration he cites. Scalia's example is based on the facts of
Union Gas, where the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was al-
leged to have become the "owner or operator" of a hazardous
waste site when it was excavating a creek in connection with
flood-control efforts and struck a deposit of coal tar that had
been left by Union Gas, causing the tar to seep into the creek.99
Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA),' ° any "owner or
operator" of a hazardous waste site, including a state, could be
held liable for the costs of cleaning up the site.101 On those
facts, it does seem like a stretch to say that Pennsylvania made
a voluntary decision to operate a hazardous waste site. Just as
the state's decision to hire employees in Missouri Employees 1"2
was not in any real sense a voluntary choice that could be inter-
preted as impliedly consenting to suit under the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),1°3 so implying a waiver of the Eleventh
98. Id.
99. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 5-6.
100. 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (1994).
10L See id. § 9607.
102. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). For a description of this case, see supra
notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
103. In fact, four of the five lower court opinions that have questioned the
validity of the implied waiver doctrine after Seminole Tribe, see supra note 77,
involve suits brought by state employees seeking overtime pay due under the
FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). See Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir.
1997) (reasoning that because "New York had employees before the enactment
of the FLSA and before it was made applicable to the States, its continued
status as an employer cannot realistically be construed as a waiver of immu-
nity"); Digiore v. Illinois, 962 F. Supp. 1064, 1076, 1075 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (noting
that "the State never 'consented' to the application of FLSA," and thus "'the
FLSA cannot provide the predicate for a constructive waiver of immunity by
acceptance of federal funds"; also distinguishing the State's operation of a
railroad in Parden and noting that "[a] state can hardly manifest consent to
suit by 'choosing' to perform an essential governmental function" or by "hiring
and paying its employees," "activities that the state has but little choice to en-
gage in"); Goebel v. Colorado, No. 93-K-1227, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20929, at
*29-31 (D. Colo. June 25, 1996) (questioning the continued viability of the
implied waiver doctrine "in the context of the cases at bar," where an essential
state governmental function was at issue and "the choice of either waiving its
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Amendment on the facts of Union Gas might indeed be tanta-
mount to an abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment irrespec-
tive of the state's wishes.
But not all federal legislation passed under Congress's Ar-
ticle I powers can be characterized in this way. Most notably,
when Congress passes a statute under the Spending Clause,0 4
it offers the states a substantial amount of federal money-
money over which Congress has complete control and to which
the states have no legitimate claim of entitlement. The states
have the option of accepting or rejecting such an offer, but if
they choose to accept, it is not unfair to require them to comply
with the conditions Congress sets out in the statute.105 Soliciting
a waiver of the Eleventh Amendment from a state that chooses
to receive federal money is very different from unilaterally ab-
rogating the state's immunity without giving it any real say in
the matter.
Although more problematic, some statutes passed under
the Commerce Clause and Congress's other Article I powers
might also be described as regulating an activity that the state
has voluntarily undertaken. In Parden, for example, the State
of Alabama chose to operate a railroad, an activity typically
engaged in by private corporations, knowing that interstate
railroads were heavily regulated by federal statute. 6 Assuming
the statute was clear enough to put the state on notice that
state-owned railroads, like privately owned ones, could be sued
Eleventh Amendment immunity or disbanding much of the executive branch
of the state government" did not provide the State with any "realistic op-
tions"); AFSCME v. Virginia, 949 F. Supp. 438, 442 (W.D. Va. 1996) (arguing
that a finding of implied waiver would be tantamount to implying waiver
"simply because the Commonwealth engaged in commerce"); see also Taylor v.
Virginia, 951 F. Supp. 591, 602-03 (E.D. Va. 1996) (refusing to find that the
State had impliedly agreed to be sued under the Fair Labor Standards Act
because "the FLSA is not a voluntary spending program giving states the op-
portunity to decide whether to accept the program's benefits on the condition
of waiving immunity").
Although these decisions bar individual state employees from suing the
state in federal court to collect wages owed under the FLSA, the FLSA is still
enforceable against the states via other enforcement mechanisms that do not
implicate the Eleventh Amendment: a private injunction action, a suit filed on
behalf of the employees by the Department of Labor, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(c)
(1994), or a damages suit filed in state court. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness,
99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996).
104. For the language of the Spending Clause, see supra note 13.
105. For a discussion of the scope of Congress's authority to impose condi-
tions when legislating under the Spending Clause, see infra Part III-A.
106. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964); see also supra
notes 26-28 and accompanying text (further describing Parden).
[Vol. 82:793
19981 IMPLTED WAIVER AFTER SEMINOLE TRIBE 817
by injured employees, it was reasonable to interpret the state's
voluntary decision to become involved in the railroad business
as an implicit agreement to be subject to suit in federal court. It
is true, as one commentator has argued, that "[a] state does not
enter into the railroad business as a way of expressing consent
to suit in federal court,"107 but that observation does not seem
entirely relevant in light of the law's longstanding notions of
"consent." Traditionally, an actor's voluntary decision to act in
a certain way-assuming she knows the consequences of that
choice-will satisfy legal requirements of consent, without re-
gard to whether her motive for so acting was to give consent."'8
For another example, consider Mills Music, Inc. v. Ari-
zona,"° where the Ninth Circuit concluded that the State of
Arizona had impliedly consented to be sued under the Copy-
right Act when it chose to use a copyrighted musical composi-
tion as the theme song for its state fair. Although it may be
true that the State of Arizona "as a practical matter [had] no
choice but to utilize copyrighted material in carrying out the
basic functions of government,"110 it did have a choice about
whether it would sponsor a state fair-just as the State of Ala-
bama had no choice but to hire employees who might get in-
jured on the job, even though it did have a choice about
whether to acquire a commercial operation and employ the
personnel involved in running it. The critical fact in both
Parden and Mills Music is that the state "voluntarily engaged
107. Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal Fiction: Federal Interests and
the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1165 (1989) (also referring
to the Parden doctrine as "a judicial leap of imagination").
108. For example, a spectator does not attend a sporting event as a way of
expressing consent to being hit by a flying ball, but nevertheless is deemed to
have assumed the risk of such an injury. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 485-86 (5th ed. 1984).
Likewise, a student does not try out for a sports team as a way of expressing
consent to a drug test, but the Supreme Court has upheld the random drug
testing of high school athletes, reasoning that "[b]y choosing to 'go out for the
team,' they voluntarily subject themselves to a degree of regulation even
higher than that imposed on students generally" and "have reason to expect
intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including privacy." Vernonia
School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 115 S. Ct. 2386, 2393 (1995).
109. 591 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1979).
110. John C. Beiter, Recent Development, Copyright Infringement and the
Eleventh Amendment: A Doctrine of Unfair Use?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 225, 262
(1987). Though critical of the ruling in Mills Music, Beiter acknowledges that
"a state instrumentality that not only uses a copyrighted work without
authority, but also attempts to register the work as its own, may have im-
pliedly waived constitutional immunity." Id. at 263 n.292 (citation omitted).
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in what is essentially a commercial activity"-the operation of
a railroad in Parden, the planning of a state fair in Mills Music-
"well after federal legislation regulated the activity," and there-
fore could reasonably be deemed to have impliedly waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity.11'
Assuming different facts in Union Gas, even the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania might be said to have acted volun-
tarily so as to impliedly consent to be sued under CERCLA.
Suppose, for example, that the coal tar deposited by Union Gas
had started to find its way into the creek without any inter-
vention on the part of the Commonwealth. Suppose further
that the Commonwealth-acting like a private commercial de-
veloper-had voluntarily chosen to acquire the affected prop-
erty for redevelopment purposes'12 and had refused to clean up
111. Mills Music, 591 F.2d at 1286. The specific ruling in Mills Music became
suspect once the Supreme Court required Congress to satisfy the clear statement
rule when soliciting an implied waiver or abrogating the Eleventh Amend-
ment, see supra notes 36-38 and 48-50 and accompanying text (describing the
clear statement rule). The Ninth Circuit ultimately overruled Mills Music on
the grounds that the Copyright Act did not satisfy the clear statement rule.
See BV Eng'g v. University of Cal., 858 F.2d 1394, 1398 n.1 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1090 (1989). But after the Supreme Court held in Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), that Article I gave Congress the
power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment, see supra notes 52-56 and ac-
companying text, Congress relied on that power in passing the Copyright
Remedy Clarification Act of 1990, which clearly indicated its intent to abro-
gate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from copyright infringement
suits. See 17 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994) (providing that "[any State, any instru-
mentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality
of a State acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be immune, under the
Eleventh Amendment ... or under any other doctrine of sovereign immunity,
from suit in Federal court by any person, including any governmental or non-
governmental entity, for ... any... violation under this title"). See generally
3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 12.01[E][2][b], at 12-47 to 12-48 (1997) (discussing abrogation in the Copy-
right Remedy Clarification Act). Now that Union Gas has been overruled by
Seminole Tribe, Congress no longer has the power to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment when legislating under the Copyright and Patent Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, but Seminole Tribe does not bar Congress from using
that clause to solicit an implied waiver of the Eleventh Amendment in a case
like Mills Music.
112. Cf Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984) (allowing the
state to condemn certain private residential property and transfer ownership
from the lessors of the property to its lessees without "taking actual posses-
sion of the land" or "itself... us[ing the] property" in any way); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954) (permitting the District of Columbia to use
its eminent domain power for purposes of redeveloping private property for
sale or lease to other private parties, even though that meant "taking from
one businessman for the benefit of another businessman").
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the tar, even though it knew that any owner or operator of a
hazardous waste site was liable for cleanup costs under
CERCLA. Under those circumstances, it would seem fair to
say that the Commonwealth voluntarily chose to become the
owner or operator of a hazardous waste site and thereby im-
pliedly waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Admittedly, line-drawing problems arise with statutes en-
acted pursuant to the Commerce Clause and other portions of
Article I that are avoided when Congress acts under the
Spending Clause. These challenging line-drawing issues might
tempt a court to conclude that Congress may solicit an implied
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment only when legislating under
the Spending Clhbuse.113 "But the luxury of precise definitions
is one rarely enjoyed in interpreting and applying the general
provisions of our Constitution.""' And certainly a state that
chooses to take over the operation of a private factory should
not be immune from suit if it decides-in violation of congres-
sional legislation that clearly puts it on notice that entry into
this market will create a risk of federal court litigation-to
pollute the surrounding waters, maintain unsafe working con-
ditions, fix prices, or misuse copyrighted or patented materials.
In those circumstances, Justice Scalia's views notwithstanding,
it seems wrong to say that implying waiver is tantamount to
abrogation.
113. The complexity of these line-drawing issues did lead the Court in
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), to
refuse to make any further effort to define what was a "traditional,' "integral,'
or 'necessary" governmental function, id. at 546, or to distinguish between
governmental and proprietary activities for purposes of the Tenth Amend-
ment. See id. at 537-47. But the Court did so in the context of getting thejudiciary out of the business of using the Tenth Amendment to "protect the
States from overreaching by Congress." Id. at 551. "State sovereign inter-
ests... are more properly protected by procedural safeguards inherent in the
structure of the federal system than by judicially created limitations on fed-
eral power," the Court concluded. Id. at 552. Thus, the Court expressed a
preference to rely on the "political process"-that is, "the built-in restraints
that our system provides through state participation in federal governmental
action"-to "ensured that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated." Id. at 556. It is not clear, however, that the current Court still
endorses the approach taken in Garcia. See infra note 150. In any event, as
argued in the text, the Court cannot legitimately follow that approach here
and simply wash its hands of the whole inquiry. For further discussion of the
Tenth Amendment's implications for the continued viability of the implied
waiver doctrine, see infra Part HI.B.
114. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 561 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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The final objection to reviving the implied waiver doc-
trine-that the doctrine's validity is suspect because Seminole
Tribe rejected Parden's "surrender theory"-is similarly over-
broad. Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress may not use its
Article I powers to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment neces-
sarily rejects the theory articulated in Parden, among other
places,115 that the states forfeited their Eleventh Amendment
protection by virtue of the fact that they "surrendered a portion
of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the power to
regulate commerce."1 16 As a result, a state may not be deemed
to have waived its immunity simply because it hired employees.
Seminole Tribe does not foreclose the possibility, however, that
a state may be deemed to have waived its immunity by volun-
tarily accepting federal funds i7 or by voluntarily choosing to
engage in an activity subject to federal regulation.118
115. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1989)
(plurality opinion); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Depart-
ment of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 286 (1973).
116. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
117. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a
state may waive the Eleventh Amendment even in the absence of congres-
sional abrogation, and that "[olne way for a state to waive its immunity is to
accept federal fimds where the funding statute manifest[s] a clear intent to
condition participation in the programs fimded under the Act on a State's con-
sent to waive its constitutional immunity") (quoting Atascadero State Hosp.
v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985)); Gehrt v. University of Ill., No. 96-1317,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10178, at *7 (C.D. Ill. May 22, 1997) (observing that
states "may consent to federal jurisdiction... by participating in a federally
funded program that explicitly requires consent for participation).
118. See Premo v. Martin, 119 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that a
state "will be deemed to have waived its sovereign immunity when ... Con-
gress clearly intended to condition the state's participation in a program or
activity on the state's waiver of immunity"); Nihiser v. Ohio EnvtL Protection
Agency, No. C2-94-1258, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15405, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug.
6, 1997) (observing that a state "can waive its sovereign immunity when it
voluntarily participates in a program where Congress has conditioned partici-
pation in the program on the state's consent to suit in federal court"); Hodg-
son v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections, 963 F. Supp. 776, 787 (E.D. Wis. 1997)
(pointing out that a state can "waive its immunity implicitly by voluntarily
participating in a federal program when Congress has expressly conditioned
state participation in that program on the state's consent to suit in federal
court").
Even three of the five lower court opinions that have questioned the con-
tinued viability of the implied waiver doctrine, see supra note 77, seemingly
acknowledge this possibility. See Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 40 (2d Cir.
1997) (noting that "the FLSA deals with employee rights, not economic en-
deavors"); Digiore v. Illinois, 962 F. Supp. 1064, 1075 (N.D. IBl. 1997) (pointing
out that the case did not involve "a voluntary spending program whose bene-
fits the states may decide to accept or reject"); Goebel v. Colorado, No. 93-K-
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Thus, the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe breathes new
life into the implied waiver doctrine, furnishing a reason to
distinguish once again between cases of implied waiver and
cases of abrogation. Furthermore, there is no basis for reading
Seminole Tribe to undermine the implied waiver doctrine, at
least with respect to statutes passed pursuant to the Spending
Clause that condition the receipt of federal funds on a state's
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment, and with respect to statutes
passed under Congress's other Article I powers that regulate
activities voluntarily undertaken by the states. The next part
of this Article considers whether any other hurdles stand in the
way of reviving the implied waiver doctrine in the post-
Seminole Tribe world.
Il. OTHER POSSIBLE HURDLES CONFRONTING THE
IMPLIED WAIVER DOCTRINE
As explained above, Seminole Tribe does not jeopardize con-
gressional efforts to enact legislation that expressly conditions a
state's voluntary decision to accept federal funds or participate
in a federally regulated activity on its willingness to waive the
Eleventh Amendment, as long as such legislation satisfies the
clear statement rule. Nevertheless, such statutes must otherwise
pass constitutional muster and fall within one of Congress's Ar-
ticle I powers.'19 One such power that is likely to be of critical
1227, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20929, at *29 (D. Colo. June 25, 1996) (observing
that "[tihe sine qua non of waiver"-"the voluntary exercise of a real option"-
was absent there).
Likewise, inAFSCME v. Virginia, 949 F. Supp. 438, 443 (W.D. Va. 1996),
the court rejected on the merits the plaintiffs' argument that "discovery might
possibly produce evidence that the Commonwealth waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by participating in a federal program in which Con-
gress explicitly conditioned participation on consent to suit in federal court."
Rather than simply noting that such an argument was unavailing in the wake
of Seminole Tribe, the court denied the plaintiffs' request for additional dis-
covery on the ground that they had "made no colorable showing of waiver" and
were merely "seek[ing] to undertake a fishing expedition," given that they had
"not even been able to identify a specific program in which the Commonwealth
participates that requires such a waiver." Id. at 443-44.
119. For example, under the Court's decision in United States v. Lopez, a
statute passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause must be aimed at regulating
one of three types of activities: "the use of the channels of interstate com-
merce"; "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce"; or "those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce." 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
Applying this test, the Lopez majority struck down the Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(25), 922(q)(2)A) (1994), which made it a fed-
eral crime to possess a gun within 1,000 feet of a school. The Lopez ruling
marked the first time in almost 60 years that the Court had found that a stat-
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importance in this context is the Spending Clause,120 and it is
therefore important to consider the scope of Congress's authority
to condition the receipt of federal monies on states' waiver of
their Eleventh Amendment immunity. It is also necessary to
analyze whether the Court's recent Tenth Amendment 12 1 cases
impose any additional limits on the implied waiver doctrine.
These two issues are discussed in the following sections.
A. THE SPENDING CLAUSE CASES
The Supreme Court has long recognized, most recently in
South Dakota v. Dole"z and New York v. United States," that
Congress's Spending Clause powers are sweeping and are not
necessarily circumscribed by the scope of its other enumerated
powers. In Dole, for example, the Court observed that '"the
power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys
for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legis-
lative power found in the Constitution.'"'24 As a result, the
Court indicated, "objectives not thought to be within Article rs
ute exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power. See Louis H. Pollak, Fore-
word, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 535 (1995). Not surprisingly, therefore, it has
been the subject of extensive commentary. See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The
Commerce Clause and the Limits of Congressional Authority to Regulate the
Environment, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,421 (Envtl. L. Inst. 1995); Hovencamp,
supra note 63, at 2233-36; Stephen M. McJohn, The Impact of United States
v. Lopez: The New Hybrid Commerce Clause, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 1 (1995); Sym-
posium, The New Federalism After United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 635 (1996); Symposium, Reflections on United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH.
L. REV. 533 (1995); The Supreme Court, 1994 Term-Leading Cases, 109
HARV. L. REV. 111, 111-21 (1995).
The year after the Court's ruling in Lopez, Congress passed a new statute
criminalizing the possession within 1,000 feet of a school of "a firearm that
has moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce." 18
U.S.CA. § 922(q)(2)(A) (Supp. 1997). This statute will presumably survive
scrutiny under the test set out in Lopez. See Harry Litman & Mark D. Green-
berg, Federal Power and Federalism: A Theory of Commerce-Clause Based
Regulation of Traditionally State Crimes, 47 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 921(1997); cf. United States v. Lewis, 100 F.3d 49, 50-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
numerous cases that have distinguished Lopez and upheld a related federal
statute that prohibits a convicted felon from possessing a firearm "in or affect-
ing commerce").
120. For the language of the Spending Clause, see supra note 13.
121. For the language of the Tenth Amendment, see supra note 14.
122. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). For a description of the facts of Dole, see infra
note 125.
123. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). For a description of the facts of New York v.
United States, see infra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
124. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66, 65 (1936)).
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'enumerated legislative fields' may nevertheless be attained
through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant
of federal funds." Thus, Seminole Tribe's holding that Article
I does not give Congress authority to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment does not foreclose Congress from conditioning a
grant of federal funds on the states' willingness to consent to
be sued in federal court.126
Although Congress has broad discretion when legislating
under the Spending Clause, Dole acknowledged-and New York
v. United States confirmed' 27--the existence of four "general re-
strictions" on Congress's authority in this area:12 8 (1) Congress
must be acting "in pursuit of 'the general welfare"; 129 (2) the
statute must "'unambiguously'" specify the conditions with
which the state must comply in order to receive the federal
125. Id. For example, the statute before the Court in Dole required states
that accepted certain federal highway funds to set their legal drinking age at
21. The Court held that the condition was a proper exercise of Congress's
spending power even if the Twenty-First Amendment "would prohibit an at-
tempt by Congress to legislate directly a national minimum drinking age." Id.
at 206.
A number of commentators have criticized the Court's broad reading of
Congress's spending power. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH
THE STATE 151-57 (1993) (arguing that the use of the spending power ap-
proved in Dole subverts the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions); Lynn A.
Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911
(1995) (advocating that Spending Clause statutes be presumed invalid if they
impose conditions Congress could not otherwise require); David E. Engdahl,
The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994) (concluding that the Court's mis-
understanding of Alexander Hamilton's views about the spending power has
led to contradictions and anomalies in the Spending Clause cases); Thomas R.
McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's Trojan Horse,
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85 (criticizing Dole as inconsistent with the notion that
the federal government is one of delegated powers); Albert J. Rosenthal, Con-
ditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987)
(questioning the permissibility of funding conditions that interfere with the
states or require the relinquishment of individual rights); Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (proposing
stricter scrutiny of unconstitutional conditions); William Van Alstyne, "Thirty
Pieces of Silver" for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers Reconsidered
as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 303(1993) (arguing that state and local governments should refrain from accept-
ing federal funds conditioned on the violation of state constitutional rights).
126. Congress might even condition the federal funds on the state legisla-
ture's passage of a statute consenting to suit in federal court, thus bringing
into play the express waiver exception to the Eleventh Amendment. See supra
notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
127. See 505 U.S. at 171-72.
128. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
129. Id.
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funds in question, thereby 'enabl[ing] the States to exercise
their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation";13 (3) any conditions must be "reasonably related to
the purpose of the expenditure";"' and (4) the conditions may
not "violate any independent constitutional prohibition."132 As
a final matter, the Court warned in Dole that under some cir-
cumstances, "the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure
turns into compulsion.'"
133
130. Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
17 (1981)).
131. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 172. In Dole, the Court ac-
knowledged that its prior cases had not provided any "significant elaboration"
of this requirement. 483 U.S. at 207. The Dole Court itself declined to "define
the outer bounds of the 'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation" and specifi-
cally refused to decide whether "a condition on federal fumds is legitimate only
if it relates directly to the purpose of the expenditure to which it is attached."
Id. at 208-09 n.3. The Court's failure to articulate a specific definition of the
relatedness requirement has led to criticism. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 125,
at 1933 (observing that the Court has provided "neither a workable definition
... nor any actual or hypothetical example" of the relatedness requirement);
Engdahl, supra note 125, at 54-62 (referring to "the inaneness of
'germaneness"); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 125, at 120-23 (describing
the relatedness restriction as "contentless"); Sullivan, supra note 125, at 1456-
76 (criticizing the germaneness requirement as both over- and underinclusive).
132. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 172. Assuming that this
fourth condition is met, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions should not
pose a problem for Spending Clause statutes that condition the receipt of fed-
eral funds on the states' waiver of the Eleventh Amendment. In general, the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine has not been applied in any consistent
fashion. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 795-98 (1997) (describing the Supreme Court's inconsistent
application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine and concluding that "it
is very difficult to reconcile the cases" in this area); Rosenthal, supra note 125,
at 1121 ("Whether the conferring of a privilege may or may not be conditioned
on conduct which could not otherwise be compelled admits of no categorical
answer."). A statute that falls within the bounds of the spending power as
articulated in Dole and New York v. United States, the most relevant prece-
dents, should therefore be valid. See id. ("Where the validity of coercive con-
ditions on spending has been under consideration, the growing tendency of the
Supreme Court has been to weigh them case by case rather than to try to re-
solve them by reference to some broad formulation relating to unconstitu-
tional conditions.").
133. 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548,
590 (1937)). The Court's failure to elaborate on the reach of the coercion ex-
ception has prompted criticism from some commentators. See, e.g., EPSTEIN,
supra note 125, at 155-56 (noting that the "ostensible coercion theory" is
usually "sternly rebuffed" by the courts); Baker, supra note 125, at 1973
(observing that "any determination of the point at which 'compulsion' begins is
inevitably arbitrary or subjective"); Engdahl, supra note 125, at 78-86
(advocating that the coercion exception be replaced by the contract law dc-
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None of these limitations create a universal ban on statutes
that condition the receipt of federal funds on the states' waiver of
their Eleventh Amendment protection. First, although Congress
must be acting to serve "the general welfare," nothing in the
Court's Spending Clause or Eleventh Amendment jurispru-
dence supports the proposition that soliciting a waiver of the
Eleventh Amendment is by definition antithetical to "the gen-
eral welfare." In fact, the Court in Dole specifically instructed
the courts to "defer substantially to the judgment of Congress"
in determining whether this first criterion is met. 34 Addi-
tionally, as noted above,135 the Courtes Eleventh Amendment
cases-including Seminole Tribe-have uniformly presumed
that states are free to waive the protection afforded by that
Amendment.
The second hurdle-that any condition must be unambi-
guously specified-adds nothing to the clear statement rule,
which a statute must already satisfy to trigger the implied
waiver doctrine. 36  The third restriction-that the condition
must be "reasonably related" to the purposes underlying the
legislation-would appear to be easily satisfied by most
Spending Clause statutes, and certainly by those specifying
that any state wishing to receive the funds allocated by the
statute must waive its immunity with respect to suits challenging
the manner in which it is spending the funds or administering
the program created by the statute. 37
trines prohibiting agreements that are unconscionable or contrary to public
policy); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 125, at 118-20 (referring to "the illu-
sory nature of the coercion/inducement limitation"); Sullivan, supra note 125,
at 1428-56 (concluding that the concept of coercion is too indefinite and too
narrow).
134. 483 U.S. at 207.
135. See supra notes 22, 87-89 and accompanying text.
136. For a description of the clear statement rule, see supra notes 36-38,
47-50 and accompanying text.
137. Even Justice O'Connor, who dissented in Dole on the grounds that
"establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to
interstate highway construction to justify so conditioning funds appropriated
for that purpose," would presumably agree. 483 U.S. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). In O'Connor's view, the Spending Clause permits Congress to
"condition grants in ways that can fairly be said to be related to the expendi-
ture of federal funds," but does not allow Congress to "insist as a condition of
the use of highway funds that the State impose or change regulations in other
areas of the State's social and economic life because of an attenuated or tan-
gential relationship to highway use or safety." Id. at 217, 215 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). The key issue for her is "whether the spending requirement or
prohibition is a condition on a grant or whether it is regulation." Id. at 216
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); cf Meltzer, supra note 21, at 54 (questioning
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Although one might characterize the Eleventh Amendment
as an "independent constitutional bar" prohibiting legislation
that conditions the receipt of federal monies on the states'
waiver of the protection afforded by that Amendment, Dole's
description of this fourth limitation makes clear that the Court
would not take this position. In Dole, the Court explained that
the "independent constitutional bar" restriction is not "a pro-
hibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress
is not empowered to achieve directly," but instead is designed
simply to ensure that the power "not be used to induce the
States to engage in activities that would themselves be unconsti-
tutional."13 For example, the Court noted, Congress could not
condition the receipt of federal funds on the states' willingness
to inflict cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. 139 But given that the Eleventh Amend-
ment itself envisions the possibility of waiver,140 asking the
states to exercise their waiver rights does not require them to
violate any "independent constitutional bar." 141
The final qualification on Congress's spending power-the
possibility that a statute might be excessively "coercive"-refers
to the amount of money at stake. It does not impose a sub-
stantive bar on any particular type of string Congress might
choose to attach to a funding statute, and therefore would pose
a problem only if a state that refused to waive the Eleventh
Amendment risked losing a substantial amount of federal
whether a statute could "condition provision of tuition grants to graduate stu-
dents in mathematics on the mathematics department's waiver of immunity
from suit under the copyright, patent, and minimum wage laws"). Requiring
the states to waive their Eleventh Amendment protection with respect to suits
challenging the way in which they spend the federal funds allocated by the
statute would presumably satisfy even this stricter definition of relatedness.
138. 483 U.S. at 210.
139. See id. at 210-11.
140. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
141. Even Justice Brennan, who dissented in Dole on the grounds that the
statute at issue there conditioned the receipt of federal funds "in a manner
that abridges [the State's] right" under the Twenty-First Amendment, 483
U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., dissenting), would probably agree. In Justice Bren-
nan's opinion, the Twenty-First Amendment "itself [struck] the proper bal-
ance between federal and state authority." Id. Although Brennan would pre-
sumably describe the Eleventh Amendment in similar terms, that
Amendment strikes a different balance by allowing for the possibility of
waiver.
142. Thus, for example, the Court concluded that the statute at issue in
Dole passed muster under this criterion because only "a relatively small per-
centage of certain federal highway funds" was at issue. 483 U.S. at 211.
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funds. Moreover, as the Court recognized in Dole, every con-
gressional spending statute 'is in some measure a tempta-
tion,'" but 'to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to
coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties.'"143 There-
fore, the Court resolved to continue to be 'guided by a robust
common sense'" that presumes the states are exercising their
free will in accepting the conditions Congress imposes on the
receipt of federal funds.144
In general, therefore, these restrictions on the Spending
Clause power do not foreclose Congress from conditioning
grants of federal funds on the states' willingness to waive their
Eleventh Amendment protection. The following subsection ex-
amines whether the Tenth Amendment nevertheless limits
Congress's ability to pass such legislation.
B. THE TENTH AMENDMENT CASES
The Supreme Court's renewed interest in the principles of
state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment1 45 re-
ceived a good deal of attention in the wake of the Court's recent
decision in Printz v. United States.46 In that case, the Court
struck down the provisions in the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act (the Brady Act) that required state and local
law enforcement officials to conduct background checks on pro-
spective purchasers of handguns. 147 In so doing, the Court relied
on the principle articulated in New York v. United States1 48
that the federal government 'may not compel the States to en-
act or administer a federal regulatory program.' 149
New York v. United States, only the second Supreme Court
decision in fifty-five years to invalidate a federal statute on
Tenth Amendment grounds,150 expressly recognized, however,
143. Id. (quoting Steward Macb. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937)).
144. Id. (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
145. For the language of the Tenth Amendment, see supra note 14. The
relationship between the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments has been de-
scribed as follows: "While Congress's power to impose obligations on the states
is governed by the Coures Tenth Amendment jurisprudence, the availability
of remedies for the violation of such obligations is determined by the Eleventh
Amendment." Vdzquez, supra note 4, at 1703.
145. 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 922(s)(2) (1994).
148. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
149. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2380 (quoting New York v. United States, 505
U.S. at 188); see also id. at 2383 (same).
150. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 132, at 232. Interestingly, the FLSA-the
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that the Tenth Amendment is "essentially a tautology": it
merely confirms that the federal government is one of limited
powers and that a federal statute is valid only if it falls within
one of Congress's enumerated powers."' By definition, there-
fore, a statute that is otherwise authorized by the Spending
Clause or the Commerce Clause does not run afoul of the Tenth
Amendment.152 In fact, while the Court in New York v. United
same statute that is now the focus of a number of post-Seminole Tribe decisions,
see supra notes 77 and 103-has also been at the center of the controversy in
the Supreme Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence. In National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), the Court held that applying the FLSA's
minimum wage requirements to state and local employees violated the Tenth
Amendment. Usery, the first decision to find a federal statute violative of the
Tenth Amendment in almost 40 years, overruled the Court's earlier decision
in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Usery itself was overruled nine
years later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
Although the Court in New York v. United States expressly disclaimed
any intent "to apply or revisit the holdings of any of these [earlier] cases," 505
U.S. at 160, numerous commentators have noticed the tension between New
York v. United States and Garcia. See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, New York v.
United States: An Essay on the Uses and Misuses of Precedent, History, and
Policy in Determining the Scope of Federal Power, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 493, 500
(1993) (describing the Courts approach in New York v. United States as
"fundamentally at odds with the decision in Garcia"); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1563, 1572 n.34 (1994) (calling New York v. United States a "surprisingly
strong departure from Garcia"); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 635 (1993) (noting that New York v.
United States "reopened the debate"); Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court
Overruled National League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1623, 1634 (1994)
(concluding that New York v. United States "did not quite overrule Garcia").
For further discussion of Garcia, see supra note 113.
151. 505 U.S. at 156-57.
152. See id. at 155-56 (noting that the questions whether a statute comes
within one of Congress's enumerated powers and whether it violates the
Tenth Amendment are "mirror images of each other"). The Court's reference
to the Tenth Amendment as a "tautology," which is preceded by the observation
that "t]he Tenth Amendment... restrains the power of Congress, but this
limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself," id. at 156-
57, creates some ambiguity as to whether New York v. United States is articu-
lating a Tenth Amendment principle applicable to all federal statutes, or is
simply interpreting the reach of Congress's Commerce Clause power and thus
governs only statutes passed under that clause. See Tushnet, supra note 150,
at 1645-47.
Printz did not resolve this ambiguity. Although Justices O'Connor and
Thomas stated quite explicitly their view that the Brady Act violated the
Tenth Amendment, see 117 S. Ct. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id.
(Thomas, J., concurring), the majority opinion is not so clear. At one point,
the majority acknowledged that there was "no constitutional text speaking to
[the] precise question" before it, so that "the answer... must be sought in his-
torical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and
828 [V7ol. 82:793
1998] IMPLIED WAIVER AFTER SEMINOLE TRIBE 829
States held that "Congress may not simply 'comandee[r] the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them
to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program, '"153 it also
cautioned that "[tihis is not to say that Congress lacks the
ability to encourage a State to regulate in a particular way, or
that Congress may not hold out incentives to the States as a
method of influencing a State's policy choices." 54 The Court
reasoned that "encouraging a State to conform to federal policy
choices" is unobjectionable because "the residents of the State
retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not the State will
comply."155
One prominent method of influencing state policy choices
expressly endorsed by the Court in New York v. United States
is the congressional spending power. Imposing conditions on the
receipt of federal funds does not violate the Tenth Amendment,
the Court observed, because [i]f a State's citizens view federal
policy as sufficiently contrary to local interests, they may elect
to decline a federal grant."'56 Thus, New York v. United
in the jurisprudence of this Court." Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2370. Moreover, the
majority questioned the presumption that "the Tenth Amendment is the ex-
clusive textual source of protection for principles of federalism," noting that
those principles are "reflected in numerous constitutional provisions, and not
only those, like the Tenth Amendment, that speak to the point explicitly." Id.
at 2379 n.13 (citation omitted). These passages prompted the four Printz dis-
senters to chide the majority for relying on "a 'principle of state sovereignty'
mentioned nowhere in the constitutional text." Id. at 2388 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
In considering the viability of the implied waiver doctrine, this Article as-
sumes the broadest reading of New York v. United States and Printz-that
they articulate a constitutional principle, whether derived from the Tenth
Amendment or the "reasonable implications" of some other constitutional
provision, that governs all federal statutes. Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2379 n.13.
153. 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recla-
mation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981)).
154. Id. at 166. Likewise, the language in New York v. United States indi-
cating that Congress may not force the states to "enact or adminiter a federal
regulatory program," id. at 188-which is quoted in Frintz, see supra text ac-
companying note 149-is immediately followed by the acknowledgment that
"[tlhe Constitution enables the Federal Government to pre-empt state regulation
contrary to federal interests, and it permits the Federal Government to hold
out incentives to the States as a means of encouraging them to adopt sug-
gested regulatory schemes." 505 U.S. at 188.
155. 505 U.S. at 168.
156. Id.; see also Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (noting that the Tenth Amendment
does not "limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants"
because the states can "adopt 'the "simple expedient" of not yielding'")
(quoting Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947));
Merritt, supra note 150, at 1577 (noting that the "autonomy model" of the
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States upheld a Spending Clause provision in the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985157 that pro-
vided monetary incentives to states that complied with the
statute's regulations for the disposal of radioactive waste. The
Court reasoned that these incentives were "supported by af-
firmative constitutional grants of power to Congress" and
therefore were "not inconsistent" with the Tenth Amendment.158
The Court also approved another section of the statute that gave
the states "the choice of regulating [the disposal of radioactive
waste] according to federal standards or having state law pre-
empted by federal regulation" as a valid exercise of Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause and thus unassailable under
the Tenth Amendment.159
Although the Court's recent decision in Printz gave these
issues more cursory treatment, it essentially ratified the ap-
proach taken in New York v. United States 60 Moreover, the
Printz Court observed at one point that the federal government
may not "command the States' executive power in the absence
of a particularized constitutional authorization."16' Likewise, it
distinguished the Brady Act from several other statutes relied
on by the Federal Government on the ground that the other
statutes are "connected to federal funding measures, and can
perhaps be more accurately described as conditions upon the
grant of federal funding than as mandates to the States."62
Tenth Amendment endorsed in New York v. United States "places no special
constraints upon Congress' Spending Clause power" and "allows Congress to
tempt the states into following federal directives").
157. 42 U.S.C. § 2021b (1994).
158. New York v. United States,
505 U.S. at 173.
159. Id. at 173-74. But the Court struck down a provision in the statute
that required the states to either accept ownership of radioactive waste or
regulate its disposal according to federal guidelines. The Court explained that
this provision, unlike the other two, constituted an impermissible
"commandeering" of the state legislative process. See id. at 174-77.
160. See 117 S. Ct. at 2380-83. Printz did, however, extend the ruling in
New York v. United States by prohibiting Congress from "commandeering"
state executive as well as legislative officials, an extension that has been subject
to criticism. See id. at 2397-98 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. REV. 1957 (1993) (arguing that the
framers envisioned the "commandeering" of state executive, but not state leg-
islative, officials).
161. 117 S. Ct. at 2372 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 2376. Although the Court refused to "address these or other
currently operative enactments that are not before us," id., its opinion does
not suggest any inclination to rethink the scope of Congress's spending power.
See id. at 2385 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that Congress is "free to
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Thus, the Printz Court would apparently have had no objection
had Congress offered to finance the hiring of additional state
police officers, but only on the condition that those officers con-
duct background checks on handgun purchasers. Similarly,
Printz, like New York v. United States, does not prevent Con-
gress from passing a statute that seeks an implied waiver of
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, so long as the
statute is otherwise a permissible exercise of the congressional
spending or commerce power.
163
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe that Con-
gress's Article I powers do not include the authority to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity is one of a series of
recent Supreme Court decisions that have protected state sov-
ereignty at the expense of congressional prerogatives. 16 Even
though the Court has thus been very solicitous of states' rights
in recent years, Seminole Tribe need not-and should not-be
read to limit Congress's ability to use its Article I powers to en-
courage the states to impliedly waive their Eleventh Amend-
ment protection. The doctrine of implied waiver continues to
be viable in the wake of Seminole Tribe because the states
clearly can-and should be able to-waive the Eleventh
Amendment, and because Congress unquestionably can-and
should be able to-condition the states' receipt of federal
money or participation in a federal program on compliance
amend the [Brady Act] to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis
with the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal pro-
grams"); id. at 2396 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that 'nothing in the
majority's holding calls into question" the precedents permitting Congress to
attach conditions to the receipt of federal finds).
163. The Guarantee Clause of the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4
("guaranteefing] to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Govern-
ment"), seems to impose no greater hurdle for federal legislation than the
Tenth Amendment. In New York v. United States, for example, the Court
quickly disposed of the state's Guarantee Clause challenge to "permissible
conditional exercises of Congress' authority under the Spending and Com-
merce Clauses," relying on the same reasoning it had used in rejecting the
state's Tenth Amendment argument. 505 U.S. at 185. But cf Deborah Jones
Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third
Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (advocating a renewed focus on the
Guarantee Clause).
164. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997), which is described
supra at notes 146-149, 152, 160-162 and accompanying text; City of Boerne v.
Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), described supra in note 62; United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), described supra in note 119.
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with certain conditions, including waiver of the Eleventh
Amendment. So long as an Article I statute clears the "clear
statement" hurdle, explicitly giving a state notice that it is con-
senting to be sued in federal court if it voluntarily chooses to
accept federal funds or participate in a federally regulated ac-
tivity, the Supreme Court's ruling in Seminole Tribe does not
stand in the way of congressional efforts to solicit implied
waivers of the Eleventh Amendment.
